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the national war effort.” As a result, the
characteristics of sound transmission beneath the surface of the oceans, especially the effects exerted by thermal
layers, became the focus of scientific research sponsored by the Navy. By 1918
the resulting underwater sound-sensing
and transmission systems had “helped
keep the U-boats at bay.”
World War I ended less than two years
after the United States entered, and for a
few years thereafter it seemed as if the wartime spirit of cooperation in the navalscientific inquiry into oceanography’s
utility to naval warfare would continue.
However, the Republican era was a time
of American isolationism and naval retrenchment, and by 1924 the budgetary
axe had decapitated the fledgling navalscientific hybrid. A revival of the joint effort by scientists and the Navy did not
come until 1940, but not until the attack
on Pearl Harbor did the fiscal floodgates
of defense spending on such topics truly
swing open.
In the Second World War the final form
of American naval oceanography began
to emerge. Just as the submarine is the
weapons system around which Weir
weaves his story, his concept of a cultural clash between naval officers and
scientists constitutes his institutional or
political theme. Still, as Weir points out,
“Effective submariners and ASW officers
soon realized that applied oceanography
improved a ship’s chance of survival and
increased the likelihood that crewmembers would again see their families
after a difficult North Atlantic convoy or
a submarine patrol near the Japanese
home islands.” Besides patriotic motivation, the scientists hoped that memory
of “the profitable wartime application
of oceanography and the lives spared
in combat would induce the Navy to
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become the generous patron” of postwar
oceanography.
That was how it turned out, but only
because the unanticipated Soviet submarine threat provided an irresistible
impetus for many shrewd oceanographers and some astute naval officers
who served as the “translators” between
their respective cultures. The two
groups cooperated for mutual and national benefit in the Cold War, but the
cultures of the warrior and the scientist
remained as separate as oil in water.
Their testimonials were parallel, not
unified—the invincibility of U.S. fastattack and fleet ballistic missile submarines for the Navy, and the intellectual
fecundity of the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and the Scripps Institution of Oceanography for science.
This book is not light reading, but it is
invaluable to every serious student of
naval strategy, weapons systems, and the
marine environment that shapes and
limits modern warfare at sea.
KENNETH J. HAGAN

Naval War College
Monterey Program
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With the exception of Carl Boyd, John
Chapman, Gerhard Krebbs, and Bernd
Martin, historians have largely ignored
German-Japanese relations in general
and naval relations in particular. (A
further exception would be Werner
Rahn; see his “Japan and Germany,
1941–1943: No Common Objective, No
Common Plans, No Basis of Trust,” in
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the Summer 1993 issue of this journal.)
That gap in the literature has now been
filled by this collection of essays by four
eminent German and Japanese naval officers and historians: Hans-Joachim
Krug, Yôichi Hirama, Berthold J.
Sander-Nagashima, and Axel Niestlé.
Each contributes from his research specialty, and the product is a welcome reexamination of a “missed opportunity”
based on sources in British, German,
Japanese, and U.S. archives.
Part I consists of a historical overview
and analysis of German-Japanese naval
cooperation by Captain Krug, German
Navy, and Admiral Hirama, Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. Their message
is straightforward—there never existed
real cooperation between Berlin and
Tokyo, as each side was intent merely to
use the other to further its own powerpolitical agenda. This is as true for the
Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936
as it is for the follow-up Agreement for
Cultural Cooperation of November
1939. Various technical, joint, and military affairs committees were eventually
formed, mainly for “propaganda purposes”; they never met before Pearl Harbor and thereafter only “for protocol
and courtesy.” The result was a “reluctant” alliance. In August 1939 Adolph
Hitler did not tell the Japanese of Germany’s nonaggression pact with the
Soviet Union until two days before its
signing. In April 1941 Hitler refused to
inform the visiting Japanese foreign
minister, Yosuke Matsuoka, of his decision to invade the Soviet Union.
Matsuoka, in turn, did not inform the
Germans that on his way home he would
sign a neutrality pact with the Soviets.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor
came as a complete surprise to the Germans. Hastily arranged joint warfare
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agreements among the three Axis powers
on 11 December 1941 and 18 January
1942 brought few concrete measures.
Much of the book rests on the detailed
radio transmissions of the German naval
attachés in Tokyo, Admiral Paul
Wenneker and Captain Joachim
Lietzmann. These show that even in the
area of possible joint operations in the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, there was
mutual mistrust and jealousy. This
stemmed from lack of prior cooperation,
racial arrogance (by both sides), linguistic difficulties, and especially the fact
that German auxiliary merchant cruisers
and submarines had to diesel more than
thirteen thousand miles across a hundred degrees of longitude en route to the
Far East. Admiral Karl Dönitz reduced
the cargo capacity of U-boats by insisting that they carry full loads of torpedoes; he refused to share German
weapons and equipment technology
with the Japanese until August 1944, and
then only at Hitler’s insistence. In the
Indian Ocean, the one place where German and Japanese naval forces might
have been able to coordinate operations,
nothing of the sort eventuated.
Part II, by Sander-Nagashima, a German
naval officer and historian, fleshes out
much of the above. Sander-Nagashima
first analyzes the command structure of
both navies and then examines technical
and personnel matters (“Cooperation
with Caution”). He is especially critical
of German duplicity in continuing to
supply Chiang Kai-shek with military
material in large quantities and in building submarines for China, stating that
they were for Germany—in the process
“purposefully fooling the befriended
Japanese.” Perhaps in return, the Japanese refused to give direct help to German warships in the Far East; supplies,
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until 22 June 1941, had to be shipped via
the Trans-Siberian Railroad. In the final
analysis, Sander-Nagashima concludes,
naval cooperation between the two allies
was restricted to “the limitation of the
operational zones through 70 degrees
east longitude.”
Part III, written by Niestlé, a businessman and author of numerous works on
German U-boats, details the meager logistical exchanges between Berlin and
Tokyo. In terms of passengers traveling
by transport ship, a mere twenty-one
people went from Europe to Japan, and
not quite nine hundred from the Far
East to Europe; by submarine, the totals
are ninety-six and eighty-nine, respectively. In terms of material exchanges, in
1941–42 Japan shipped 104,233 tons to
Germany, of which 19,200 were lost; in
1942–43 half the 104,700 tons shipped
was lost. Of the goods shipped in both
directions by submarines, only between
20 and 40 percent ever arrived. While
the Germans were anxious for deliveries
of rubber and precious metals, the Japanese requested industrial products, technical equipment, and chemical goods.
Part IV consists of a conclusion by
Sander-Nagashima.
My criticisms of this superb work are
but two. First, the fact that it has four
authors writing separate sections has resulted in a good deal of overlap, retelling
various aspects of the story. Second, the
title does not do the book justice; it was
hardly a “reluctant” alliance but rather a
hollow, empty, or wasted one.
HOLGER H. HERWIG

University of Calgary
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During the early evening hours of 22
May 1941, the German battleship Bismarck departed Bergen, Norway, to face
the might of the Royal Navy with only
the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen in company. It was to be the battleship’s first
and only operational deployment. Five
days later, the ship went down with over
a thousand of its crew.
Considered then to be the world’s most
powerful battleship, Bismarck entered
the Atlantic when Britain was stretched
almost to the breaking point. With the
critical Battle of the Atlantic hanging in
the balance, the pursuit and sinking of
Bismarck was one of the war’s most dramatic episodes; many books and a movie
were dedicated to it. Those early works,
written mostly within twenty years after
the war, focused almost entirely on the
operation itself. None devoted attention
to the strategies, political aspects, or
operational and politico-strategic backgrounds that shaped the battleship’s deployment and the Allied responses to it.
That void has now been filled by the
two books under review, The Destruction of the Bismarck, by Holger Herwig
and David Bercuson, and The Loss of the
Bismarck: An Avoidable Disaster, by Graham Rhys-Jones. Both books bring new
information and fresh perspectives to
the tale, putting Bismarck’s operation in
its strategic context. In doing so, the authors highlight the strategic impact of
the potential outcomes of Operation
RHINE, the code name for Bismarck’s
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